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ABSTRACT
A mobile agent is a multi-threaded autonomous program th a t can be dis- 
ti.bu ted  over a heterogeneous network to perform some predefined task for its human 
creator (user). The independence, flexibility and autonomy offered by the mobile 
agent paradigm  hold many promises for the future of distributed computing [18]. 
However, for an agent to be autonomous, it must carry its code, states and results 
from host to  host. Since an agent executes on remote potentially hostile environments, 
hiding information from hosts has proven to be a tough challenge.
This thesis introduces two novel ideas tha t can be used in the mobile agent 
paradigm. First, is the use of Shamir’s [33] (f, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme 
for the distribution of the private key of a public/private key pair amongst n agents. 
Thus giving an agent the ability to use cryptographic primitives for protection of 
intermediate results obtained from previously visited hosts. An agent can use the 
public key for encryption while the private key is safely shared between the agent 
and its siblings. Second, a “cookie” will be introduced as an tool for avoiding agent 
collisions. Analogous to cookies used by web browsers for tracking of visitors to a site, 
it will be used as a tool for marking previously visited hosts. The goal of marking 
previously visited hosts is to resolve the problem of agent collisions. Agent collisions 
occurs when a group of agents from the same originator with the same purpose visits 
a particular host more than once.
vin
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Few would argue the importance of the internet as a medium for the distribution and 
retrieval of information. The vast amount of information available is overwhelming. 
W hat began as a hand full of hosts in the late 1960’s has since become a world wide 
network of over 160 million hosts [41]. This growth has not been strictly confined to 
the internet. W ith the availability of cheap and reliable hardware, smaller intra-nets 
have also experienced similar growth. A com puter’s connectivity to a network is no 
longer considered an optional add-on, but an integral part of its functionality. Until 
just recently, users were confined to well defined static sets of locations to gain network 
access. However, the recent advancements in wireless and mobile technologies means 
th a t today, the same users can literally bring the network with them. The effect of 
this growth is the ever increasing demand that the entire network infrastructure be 
more flexible and scalable.
Traditional models of network computing rely primarily on well established tech­
nology based on the client-server paradigm. In the typical client-server scenario, 
contact is initiated by the client as some form of request for execution of service. The 
server which hosts computational resources, da ta  and a static set of services performs 
the request on behalf of the client then responds with the result. Depending on the 
types of services requested, multiple rounds of interactions between the client and 
server might be required to complete the request. This model of network computing 
has its usefulness and is well suited for most applications. However, because of the 
ever increasing size and dynamics of the internet, this model is beginning to  show its 
limitations. For instance, a client requests a service from a server which the server
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has the com putational resources and necessary data  to fulfil the request bu t lack the 
knowledge (e.g. program). To complete the request, the client either has to down­
load the data  from the sever to process locally on the client’s machine or find another 
server th a t can complete the request. In either case, the model lacks flexibility and 
exerts unnecessary strain  on the network infrastructure.
The benefit of the mobile agent paradigm over the above paradigm is its inherent 
ability to process information at its source. A mobile agent is autonomous; each 
agent is encapsulated with the knowledge required to perform its function. A host is 
obligated to provide only the input and com putational resources to an agent. This 
flexibility has the potential of resolving many of the shortcomings of the client-server 
network computing model in use today. Chess et al. [6] investigation into the benefits 
of using mobile agents concluded th a t mobile agents offer a better general solution 
in term s of prototyping, transactions and scalability when compared to client-server 
model of distributed computing. Its ability to reduce network traffic, operate over in­
term itten t unreliable network connections, and execute over heterogeneous networks 
and environments makes the paradigm an attractive option for future implementa­
tions of e-commerce, information research and mobile device applications [18].
1.1 The Security  Problem
Agent code w ritten by one party typically executes on remote host under control of 
another party. Because neither party has to know or trust the other party, without 
adequate security tha t fulfills the requirements of both, participation of either party 
in this potentially beneficial relationship is unlikely.
The level of security required by an agent depends primarily on the function of the 
agent. Potential gains by implementing security on an agent must always be weighted 
against the cost of providing such security. It is arguable th a t in certain instances an 
agent requires no security. For example, an agent is created to search for information
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
on the topic, “mobile agent security”. If the purpose of the agent is to collect a 
list of links and abstracts on documents pertaining to the subject. Then the risk of 
such agent to attacks should be considered relatively low. Providing such agent with 
cryptographic security might be far too expensive to both the agent owner and remote 
hosts in terms of hardware resources such as CPU cycles and storage requirements. 
On the other hand, if an agent is carrying private and sensitive information such as, 
credit card numbers and private keys on behalf of its owner. Such agent must not only 
be protected, cryptographic primitive should be given to the agent so th a t information 
collected can be protected as well. For example, in the often used scenario where an 
agent is searching for a plane ticket from one destination to another. The importance 
of protecting secret information the agent carries on behalf of its creator is obvious. 
However, in this case, results collected by the agent from visited competing hosts 
must also be protected. To keep all participating hosts honest, none of the hosts 
should know what offers any of the other hosts has rendered.
Often, a mobile agent is thought of as an “autonomous” entity capable of making 
decisions, executing code fragments and storing results before m igrating to another 
host. Although justified, after all, autonomy is one of the underlining primitives of 
a mobile agent. However, to truly grasp the complexity of the many security issues 
associated with a mobile agent, we must think of them  at a lower level of structural 
components. Mobile agents are nothing more than  encapsulated code fragments com­
prising of execution code, execution states and data  segments. The agent m igration 
process although conceptually similar traditional migration from location to location, 
agent m igration is simply the replication of an agent on another host’s machine. An 
agent can only m igrate if the environment which “hosts ” the agent establishes a con­
nection with a target host, copies the agent on to the host before destroying the local 
copy. It is a t this level of thinking the true complexities of securing an agent can be 
realized. How does an agent hide information from a host if the host has to tal control
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over the agent? W hat stops a host from deleting the agent or its da ta  all together? 
W hat if the host refuses to transport the agent? As you can see the problem of a 
malicious host is quite challenging.
1.2 Thesis  P o s i t io n
Until Sanders and Tschudin [32], using only software approaches for the protection 
of a mobile agent was generally considered to be impossible. In [32], the proposed 
solution uses the notion of encrypted functions for the protection of an agent and its 
functionality (see Chapter 4). However, this m ethod is complex and has limited appli­
cations. Therefore, for most applications, the problem of protecting an agent from a 
malicious host remains mostly unresolved. The position of this thesis is that, although 
the agent itself cannot be protected, using cryptographic primitives, its resu lts /da ta  
can. The term  protection in this case is the encrypting of results obtained by an agent 
on previously visited hosts. The use of cryptographic primitives for the protection of 
da ta  has its limitations, a malicious host will still be able to delete encrypted results 
on an agent. However, this problem is wide ranging in the mobile agent paradigm 
as mentioned earlier. The premise behind using cryptographic primitives is “out of 
site of m in d ”. If a host cannot decipher any meaning from data  contained within an 
agent, the likely hood of tam pering by such host can be dram atically reduced. An 
example is the agent searching for the airline ticket, if a host cannot determine what 
offers other hosts has rendered, then the hosts will tend to be more honest with its 
bid. By cryptographically enciphering the agent’s results, a host is left with two de­
cisions, to delete the agent or just parts of the agent which the host believes contains 
bids from competing hosts. Because there’s no financial gain by deleting the agent, 
the host m ust weight the possibility of being detected and '’black listed” against any 
potential benefits of deleting only parts of the agent.
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1.3 Thesis Layout
This thesis will show how Sham ir’s (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme [33] can 
be used to share the private key of a public/private key pair amongst n agents. 
The public-key can be used by an agent to encrypt results obtained from visited 
host. By distributing the private key as shares, only agents w ith a piece of the 
original share can participate in the successful regeneration of the private key. Thus 
provide additional security for the protection of the private key. Chapter 2 describes 
the mobile agent paradigm including its applications and security. In Chapter 3, 
cryptographic techniques for the prevention and detection of malicious host attacks 
will be discussed. Chapter 4 will first give a general overview of Sham ir’s [33] threshold 
scheme before outlining how i t ’s used in the protocol to hid and distribute shares to 
agents. Later in Chapter 4, the protocol will be extended to show how an agent on 
a remote “trusted host” can adopt parts of the same protocol to distribute agents of 
its own. Chapter 5 will dem onstrate how the protocol can be used with RSA [28] 
keys. Chapter 6 investigates the use of a “cookie” to track agents for avoiding agent 
collision. Security related issues of using cookies will also be discussed in Chapter 
6. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis. (Note, all or parts of Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 will 
appear in the 1st annual proceedings of the Communications Networks & Services 
Research (CNSR) conference [23].)
1.4  Security  Term s For M obile Agents
The following security definitions all have relevance to security in the mobile agent 
paradigm. For every term, a general definition will first be given and whenever 
possible, the context to which it pertains to the mobile agent paradigm.
A u th e n tic a t io n :  In security, to authenticate is to verify the identity of a person or 
process. Authentication is also used as a term  for describing integrity of infor­
mation. For instance, whether results obtained by an agent has been tam pered
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with. Agents often need to authenticate a host to avoid masquerade types of 
attacks. The authentication of a host by an agent and visa-versa  is commonly 
performed through the Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), consisting of Digital 
Signatures (DS) and Digital Certificates (DC).
P u b lic -K e y  I n f r a s t ru c tu re :  A system of DC, Certificate Authorities  (CA), and 
other registration authorities th a t verify and authenticate the validity of each 
party  involved in an internet transaction. It is assumed in the rest of this thesis 
th a t DC belonging to an agent owner, or a host, are legitimate products of the 
PKI.
P u b lic -K e y  C ry p to g ra p h y : Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) refers to encryption 
e and decryption d using a pair of asymmetric keys, public-key kpub and private- 
key kpriv Each kpub is made public typically through the use of DC and kpriv 
is only known to its owner. Let the m  be a message, ,_(m) is the encryption 
of m  and (%«i,(?Ti)) =  m i s  the decryption of using the receiver’s
kpriv In the case of mobile agents, the receiver is assumed to be the owner of 
the agent unless otherwise specified.
D ig ita l s ig n a tu re s : DS are produced using kp îy which is only know it is owner. 
Once singed, the signature is non-reputable. Anyone can verify a signature 
using the associated kpub- Let sig  be the signing function, sigkj,^-^{m) is a 
signature of m  using kpriv Let ver  be the verification function of sig, if
=  true , then is valid signature on message
m. Agents and hosts can use DS for the signing of transactions. Again using 
the airline agent as an example, once the agent has determines th a t a host has 
made the best offer, DS then can be used by the agent and the host to  make 
the transaction non-reputable.
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M essag e  A u th e n tic a t io n  C ode: Message Authentication Code (MAC) is the hash­
ing of a message m  combined with a key k. Each unique k will produce a unique 
MAC on m. Let h be the hash function, then h{h[m, k)) is the MAC of message 
m  using k. The one way property of h ensures tha t each m  using k, produces 
an unique MAC. For example, a host can produce a MAC of its agent before 
dispatching the agent. Upon return of the agent, the owner can again calculate 
the MAC to verify the integrity of the agent.
O b fu sc a tio n : The obscuring or hiding of the functionality of code. Typically, obfus­
cation is used to obscure proprietary agent code. CEF [32] and code scrambling 
[27] are examples of code obfuscation.
M a sq u e ra d e : Is when an entity is disguised as another entity. Agents with limited 
permissions might masquerade as another agent with more permissions to gain 
access to  resources on a host which the agent otherwise wouldn’t have. A 
host might masquerade as another host to lure an agent into revealing private 
information such as credit card numbers and private-keys.
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CHAPTER II
MOBILE AGENTS
A mobile agent is a m ulti-threaded autonomous program th a t can be distributed 
over a heterogeneous network to perform some predefined task for its human creator 
(user). In this chapter, a more formal description of a mobile agents will be given 
with respect to its mobility, composure, benefits and applications. A more in-depth 
discussion on security issues of the paradigm will be covered in section 2.4. Since this 
thesis focuses on agent security rather than the environment which it executes (host), 
the terms mobile agent and agent will be used interchangeably.
2.1 W hat is a M obile Agent?
To answer this question, a clear distinction must first be made between a mobile agent 
and mobile code because the two terms are often used synonymously. Fuggetta et al. 
[9] considers mobile code as any program which exploits code mobility. Therefore, 
mobile agents, Remote Procedure Call (RPC), Remote Evaluation (REV), Code on 
Demand  (COD), Java ^^app le t and other code written for distributed applications 
fall within the definition of mobile code. In Figure 1, a model of a mobile agent 
is given. The mobile agent consists of Execution Code (EC), Execution State (ES) 
and Storage Space (SS) which together makeup an Execution Unit (EU). EC is the 
knowledge or “know-how” required for computation. SS encapsulates initialization 
data  and com putational results. ES includes information on the program counter, 
registers and stack information required by an agent to execute or resume execution 
after it has been suspended either for migration or hibernation. The ability to suspend 
state, and resume execution on another host is known as strong migration[9].
10
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Execution
C o d e
E x ecu tio n
Unit
(EU)
Figure 1; A Model of mobile agent as an EU.
One of the key distinguishing features between the above mentioned mobile codes 
is how each communicate between their respective originators, otherwise known as 
their level of migration. As mentioned earlier, strong migration is the ability for mo­
bile code to m igrate with sta te  information so th a t execution can resume on another 
host. However, in each of the client server models mentioned above, code mobility is 
restricted to the passing of procedures and data, or weak migration[9]. For example 
download Java^^^applet contains code and data, but an applet lack the ability to 
suspend execution and m igrate to  another host to resume execution. In Figure 2, 
similarities and differences of the different mobile code paradigms are shown. Figure 
2a-c show the more traditional client-server models of code migration. Figure 2a, is 
the communication model of RPC, param eters (e.g. data  and threshold of computa­
tion) of the request is sent from the client to the server which hosts the know-how and 
com putational resources. The server executes the request before returning results to 
the client. In the COD model of Figure 2b, the client which hosts the computational 
resources and data, requests the know-how from the server. Once the client receives 
the know-how from the server, execution is carried out on the client’s machine using 
local com putational resources. Figure 2c, the REV model, the client provides the 
know-how and data, execution is carried out by the server before results are returned
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to the client. In each of the these synchronous models, the client initiates contact 
with the server and blocks for a response from the server. Figure 2d, is the mobile 
agent model of communication, the User dispatches the agent which has the know­
how, storage (storage encapsulates execution results and if necessary initialization 
data) and execution sta te  information. In this model, each host provides the data  
and com putational resources required for execution. The agent migrates from host 1 
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R om ote P ro ced u re  Call (RPC)
resu lt$ (da ta )
a)
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C ode o n  D em and (COD)
rasponsa lknow -tiow )
b)
know -how (data)














Figure 2: Comparison of communication models between Remote. Procedure Call
(RPC), Code on Demand (COD), Remote Evaluatton (REV) and Mobile Agent (MA).
In the more traditional mobile code paradigm such as in distributed systems, code 
migration is designed for relatively small scale networks. Code is passed from one 
machine/processor to an other. To the programmer, these actions are seamless and
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transparent because they are handled at the operating system level. Location of 
execution is never a concern to users of such system, as far as they know, everything 
appears to be executing on their local machine. In the left diagram of Figure 3, each 
EU resides w ithin the distributed execution environment (In distributed computing 
environments EU can be considered as individual processes or a thread of a m ulti­
threaded process). In contrast, the mobile agent paradigm is designed with the vast 
scale of the internet in mind. Agents migrate independently from host to host and 
must always be aware of its location and the identity of its current host (Right diagram 
of Figure 3).
EU EU : - EU : I EU . EU . ( EU
D istrib u ted  E x e cu tio n  E n v rio n m en t
Figure 3: Distributed execution environment (left.) Us. m,obile agent computational 
environment (right).
2.2  W hy Use M obile A gen ts?
Various authors have studied benefits of the mobile agent paradigm [6 , 18, 9, 15]. The 
consensus between them  seems to be tha t the mobile agent paradigm  offers greater 
flexibility, scalability and transportability over the traditional client-server paradigm. 
The next few sections will summarize some of the most im portant features that make 
the paradigm  so promising.
O v e r c o m e s  n e t w o r k  la t e n c y .  Network latency refers to the time it takes a packet 
to get from the sender to the receiver. In networks with high noise to signal
13
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ratio or networks with low bandwidth connections, network latency can be 
substantial. Because a mobile agent reside on the target host, network latency 
is rarely a factor during its execution.
L o y a lt y :  An agent is created to perform computations on behalf of its owner. The 
agent represents the owner on the network, therefore, performs only tasks which 
the user assigns.
R e d u c e s  n e t w o r k  tr a ff ic :  Often, results collected by an agent is much smaller than 
the data  required for its computation. Moving an agent to the source of da ta  
reduces not only the amount of data  to be sent over a network, but the number 
of rounds of communication between the client (agent user) and remote hosts.
E x e c u t e  a s y n c h r o n o u s ly :  Agents once dispatched can operate independently and 
autonomously without further interactions with its creator. This unique ability 
is particularly well suited for networks with unreliable or expensive connections.
D y n a m i c  a d a p t a b i l i t y  a n d  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t :  An agent can sense and adapt to their 
environment. If a host is unable to  provide the requested service, an agent has 
the ability to m igrate to another host. In the event a host environment becomes 
unfavorable, an agent can migrate to another host or hibernate until favorable 
conditions are again available.
O p e r a t e  in  h e t e r o g e n o u s  n e t w o r k s  a n d  e n v ir o n m e n t s :  An agent typically op­
erating in a Virtual Machine (VM) execution environment independent from 
host hardware. Agent migration protocols protect agents against network in­
compatibilities.
F l e x i b l e  a n d  s c a la b le :  The typical client-server model of computing limits a client 
to a static set of services offered by a server. The mobile agent paradigm
14
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overcomes these limitations because it allows the user of an agent to design the 
agent to suit their specific set of needs.
2 .3  M A  A pplica tions
The goal of the mobile agent paradigm is the eventual adoption by the internet 
community for use in various research and commercial applications. Ever since the 
introduction of mobile agent paradigm [36], there has been ongoing discussions about 
its application domain [24]. Various “killer applications” has since been proposed, 
below are some of well acknowledged applications of the mobile agent paradigm. If 
possible, security requirements of each will also be included.
2 .3 .1  E - C o m m e r c e
Mobile agents for use in e-commerce is a particularly popular idea [35, 31, 17]. By 
dispatching agents to seek out products or services not only reduces network traffic 
but can also save the agent user considerable amount of time. Once created, an agent 
is independent from its owner, depending on the design of the agent, it will seek for 
the products or services and communicate with its owner only upon completion of the 
task or when some criteria set by the owner is meet. Contract negotiations, service 
brokering, auctions and stock trading are just some of the applications mobile agents 
are well suited for [9].
In most instances using a mobile agent for e-commerce applications requires the 
highest levels of security. For example, a “shopping agent” might have to carry 
electronic cash, credit card information and private signature keys to sign contracts. 
In this case, the owner would obviously want to protect his/her assets including 
results collected by his or her agent. Another type of shopping scenario agent is the 
“window shopper”. Although such agent might not be carrying any “secret” financial 
assets, bu t as mentioned in the airline ticket scenario, bids gathered by such agent 
still require protection from spying hosts.
15
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2 .3 .2  P e r s o n a l  A s s i s t a n t s
An example of a mobile agent used as a personal assistant is the meeting agent 
[18] dispatched for setting up a meeting between a number of participants. In this 
scenario, several people need to arrange a meeting time th a t suits the schedules of 
all participants. Each participant can create an agent preloaded with acceptable 
times which he/she can meet. The agents can then meet to make the necessary 
arrangements. If an agreement can be made, each agent returns to its respective 
owner with the scheduled time for the meeting.
Security for such agent depends on sensitivity of the data  (schedule of individual 
participant) and the level of security sought by their respective owners. In cases 
where participants wish to keep their da ta  hidden, arrangements can be made so tha t 
negotiations takes place on a m utual trusted host often referred to as a Trusted Third 
Party  (TTP).
2 .3 .3  N e t w o r k  M a n a g e m e n t
The use of mobile agents for remote network adm inistration can be argued as the “kill 
application” for most network adm inistrators. A mobile agent’s ability to adaptively 
respond to network events in real-time make them  a very powerful tool for system 
monitoring and hardware reconfiguration. An agent’s mobility and independence can 
also be useful for distribution of software on the network wide bases.
An adaptive agent {intelligent agent) over time can learn the normal behavior of 
the resource i t ’s monitoring. Such agents can be dispatched to monitor vital network 
resources for “abnormal” behavior so th a t preventative measure can be taken prior 
to the occurrence of catastrophic events. If an agent senses abnormal behavior, the 
adm inistrator can be notified, and another “maintenance agent” could be dispatched 
with preloaded configuration and support software to perform required services. Thus
16
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eliminate the need for such software to be installed on every resource. The m ainte­
nance agents can also be used for applying software patches, reconfiguring of existing 
applications and installation of new applications as they become available.
An agent used for network management is vulnerable to both internal and external 
threats. The most likely internal treat is disgruntled employees assuming th a t all 
hosts within the network are trusted. A disgruntled employee with access to internal 
system resources can potentially modify or delete an agent. External threats to such 
agent usually depend on the resilience of the firewall protecting the network.
2 .3 .4  I n f o r m a t i o n  R e t r i e v a l
There are many benefits of dispatching MA for information processing and retrieval 
[18]. Information agents have the ability to process information without being con­
fined by operational time of their owner. D istributing multiple agents to process or 
search for information increase the scope of the of coverage while reducing the time 
required to  complete the task. Information retrieval and processing typically involve 
the processing of large amounts of da ta  to obtain relatively small amount of results. 
Again, by sending agents to the source of information, only the results need to be 
transported by the agent, thus reducing load on the network infrastructure.
The level of security required for an information retrieval agent depends on the 
sensitivity of the information being collected. Information gathered on publicly avail­
able sources might not require protection, but encryption still can be used if the agent 
owner does not wish to disclose the type of information sought by the agent. For ex­
ample, if a commercial enterprise is seeking data  for a new product or service under 
development. Although the d a ta  gathered are from publicly available sources, there 
would still be the need to hide sources and composure of such data  from competitors.
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2 .3 .5  M o b ile  D e v ic e s
Perhaps the most natural application of a mobile agent is in mobile devices such as 
cell phones, personal organizers, notebook computers, e tc ,.. Most mobile devices rely 
on wireless technology which at best is sporadic in availability and have limited band- 
wMth. Another inherent weakness of mobile devices with the exception of notebook 
computers is their limited processing power and storage capacity. User of mobile 
devices can dispatch an agent when network connection is available and collect it at 
a later tim e when network connection is once again available. Thus eliminating the 
need to transfer large amount of da ta  to the device to be processed locally.
As with all applications of mobile agent, security requirement of the agent depends 
on its functionality and the sensitivity data  within the agent. However, mobile device 
users m ust always take into consideration the lim itation of their devices, particu­
larly the lack of processing power and storage capacity when making security related 
decisions.
2.Ji. M A  Secu rity  Issues and C ounterm easures
Many functional mobile agent systems have already been implemented [10, 7, 21, 12]. 
However, their use has yet to be widely adopted outside the research and academic 
arenas mainly because of the many unresolved security related issues. Mobile agent 
systems as with any network computing platforms have four core security require­
ments [15]. First, both agents and platforms must have confidentiality protection 
against potential eavesdroppers and thieves. Second, security policies m ust provide 
for varying levels of code and data  integrity. Third is the accountability of both 
agents and hosts for any damages caused by malicious actions or poorly w ritten 
code. Finally, agent platforms must ensure availability of resources for agents (e.g. 
CPU cycles, network bandwidth, tem porary storage space e tc ... ) if prior contractual 
agreements bound hosts to do so.
18
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As discussed earlier, the introduction of mobile agents into a network posses many 
security related issues. An agent typically executes on remote potentially hostile 
environments. This leaves the agent open to various types attacks by malicious hosts 
and hosts to attacks by agents [2, 14]. The security domain of the mobile agents 
paradigm  can be broken into two broad categories.
1. Securing remote hosts from malicious agents.
2. Securing agents from malicious hosts.
Many solutions to security issues related to the mobile agent paradigm  have been 
proposed by various authors, unfortunately, they are ad hoc in nature because of the 
absence of well defined set of specifications. The rest of this chapter will discusses 
some these security issues for both hosts and agents along with various proposed 
m ethods for countering them.
2 .4 .1  H o s t  S e c u r i t y
Any host which offers external agents access to its resources faces many serious threats 
from a malicious agent [14, 15, 2]. The attacks a mobile agent host might face are 
similar to attacks any traditional host connected to a network faces. These include; 
masquerading, denial of service and unauthorized access. Fortunately, many m ethods 
to protect against a malicious agent can be adapted from the traditional client-server 
model of security. Mechanisms for process isolation, resource access control are al­
ready in place on most hosts. Well known and proven cryptographic techniques for 
encryption/ decryption, signatures and authentication are readily available for use by 
every host.
Bierman and Cloete [2] classified countermeasures to agent th reats as suited either 
for prevention  or detection. The same classification will be used here for countermea­
sures classification of host treats as well. For a host, the first and obvious goal is to 
detect malicious or poorly written agent code prior to its execution. However, this
19
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is not always possible or reliable. Therefore, the goal of prevention is to contain or 
minimize the effects of such code.
D e t e c t i o n :  An example of detection is the static type checking of downloaded Java'^^ 
byte code implemented in the J a v a ^ ^ secu r ity  architecture [16]. Before a down­
loaded applet is perm itted to execute, the class loader invokes the verifier which 
checks for memory management violations such as stack overflow, underflow and 
illegal type casts within the applet code. Signed code can also be used as part of 
an overall detection strategy. Allowing only signed code from verifiable trusted  
entities to execute does not guarantee code integrity, however, it does allow a 
host to seek retribution in cases where the code has caused damages. Agents 
which record their itinerary[5] and can prove tha t they’ve already executed on 
other hosts trusted  by the current host can also give some assurance on the 
integrity of the agent code.
Predictably, the above mentioned m ethods for detection all have its associated down 
sides. It might be computationally infeasible for an host to examine every line of 
code for every agent prior to execution. There are also instances where the host 
might learn nothing on the intent of the code prior to execution if the code has been 
intentionally obfuscated [11] or encrypted [32]. To require every agent to be signed 
could mean th a t many un-signed non-malicious agents would have to be turned away 
thus limiting wide adaption of the mobile agent paradigm by the general public. 
Agents th a t have executed on other trusted  hosts are still subject to tem pering on its 
m igration from one host to another. For example, if the itinerary of an agent shows 
th a t the agent m igrated from a trusted  host, then to an un-trusted host, prior to its 
m igration to the current host. How confident is the current host th a t the agent hasn’t 
been tem pered with by the un-trusted host? This issue can obviously be resolved by 
limiting access to agents with an itinerary of only trusted hosts. However, this again 
limits the usefulness of the mobile agent paradigm.
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P r e v e n t io n ;  A key requirement of host prevention is ensuring agents cannot interfere 
w ith other agents or their environments. This can be accomplished through the 
use of w hat’s know as reference monitors to establish isolated domains for each 
agent and to  control all resources access by an agent. Reference m onitors uses 
a number of traditional security techniques such as: process isolation, resource 
access control and cryptographic primitives for information enciphering and 
authentication. More recently, the use of interpreted programming languages 
has also offered an additional layer of abstraction against agents. The most 
popular are Java™  [16] and SafeTcl [26].
The Java ^'^programming language implements w hat’s known as a sandbox 
model of security. As mentioned earlier, static type checking of download code 
is a powerful tool for prevention of attacks. For detection, Java ’"'^uses w hat’s 
called a Security Manager. Similar to a reference monitor, the Security Manager 
control all access to system resources during runtime.
SafeTcl is an interpreted language used by AgentTcl [10]. SafeTcl uses a padded 
cell concept where un-trusted or suspicious code is executed w ithin the padded 
cell before being allowed to be executed within the main interpreter.
Unlike detection techniques, prevention techniques are more well established and are 
widely implemented. The overall security of any host system often depends on an 
organization’s security policy and their willingness to follow through on its imple­
mentation. Security breaches even in well established systems and languages occur 
frequently due to lack of willingness to implement security policies already in place.
2 .4 .2  A g e n t  S e c u r i t y
Agent security is widely believed to be more challenging when compared to  host 
security. This can be partially attribu ted  to the fact tha t the mobile agent paradigm 
is relatively new and partially to the autonomous encapsulated nature of an agent.
21
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Treats against an agent from a malicious host can be categorized into four categories
of: integrity attacks, denial of service, confidentiality attacks and authentication risks
[2].
I n t e g r i t y  A t t a c k s :  Violations to an agent’s code, data  or states are considered in­
tegrity attacks. There are two prevalent categories of violations, active and 
passive. Example of passive violations occurs when a host intentionally delays 
or refuses the transmission of an agent. More serious are active violations when 
an host m anipulates an agent’s code, state or data  to its benefit.
D e n i a l  o f  S e r v ic e  A t t a c k s :  Denial of service attacks occurs when an host denies 
an agent access to its resources. For example, a host might have previously 
been compensated to provide a certain set of services for an agent but, upon 
arrival of the agent, the host refuses the agent the previously agreed services. 
There are many reasons for a host to refuse agent such services but the most 
prevalent is the potential for financial gain.
A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  R is k s :  Consequence of agent autonomy is the need for an agent 
to be more location aware than  its traditional client-server counterpart. In 
the traditional mobile code paradigms of Figure 2, connection is established by 
the client to the server. In each of the model, authentication can proceed any 
transmission of code. For a mobile agent, authentication typically occurs after 
the arrival of the agent. Agents then are susceptible to masquerading attacks 
by a host. For example, suppose the airline agent believes its being hosted by 
a trusted  m ajor airline, but instead it has been ’’hijacked” by the FlyByNight 
host disguised as the m ajor airline host.
C o n f id e n t ia l i t y  A t t a c k s :  An agent is often embedded with private or sensitive 
information belonging to its owner. To compromise an agents confidentiality 
implies th a t the agent is either illegally accessed or its privacy is under attack.
oo
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The most obvious is a host which eavesdrops on an agent to  steal information 
such as private keys or credit card information. However, proprietary algorithms 
of an agent could also be target of such attacks.
Agent security similar to host security should also implement two lines of defence. 
F  w ever, for an agent, the first line of defence should be the prevention of possible 
attacks by malicious hosts. In the case where prevention is unattainable due to 
factors such as technological limitations. Then detection mechanisms in terms of 
result authentication should be used to validate results obtained by an agent.
P re v e n tio n : The aim of prevention is to thwart possible attacks by a malicious host. 
Arguably, prevention of malicious host attacks is perhaps the toughest security 
challenge in the mobile agent paradigm. The various m ethods dealing with pre­
vention of malicious hosts attacks are based on trust-based computing, recording 
and tracking and cryptographic primitives. The first two techniques will be 
discussed here while m ethods of using cryptographic primitives is reserved for 
Chapter 3.
Trust based computing relies on the availability of Secure Hardware (SH) to pro­
vide Secure Execution Environment (SEE) for an agent (see Chapter 4 for more 
details). Devices such as secure coprocessor [39], tam per resistant hardware [38] 
and Sm artCards [19] have all been proposed to provide the SEE. However, such 
hardware are either theoretical or under development.
Recording and tracking mechanisms have also been proposed. The idea of using 
cooperating agents [30] is th a t two agents are used to track each others migra­
tion. Each agent forwards the location of previous, current and next hosts to 
the other co-operating agent. In essence each agent is keeping an itinerary of 
the other agent. If either of the agent senses inconsistencies, then appropriate 
preventative measures can be taken. This idea is based on the premiss tha t not
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all hosts are malicious and tha t at least one of the agent is being hosted by a 
“trusted host”  ̂ a t any given time.
D e t e c t i o n :  W ithout adequate preventative mechanisms to protect an agent, user 
of an agent is confined to detection mechanisms to determine authenticity the 
agent and its results. Conceptually, the simplest m ethod for detection of tem ­
pering is the use of “detection objects” [22]. Detection objects are fictitious 
d a ta  closely m atching results an agent might collect on remote hosts during 
its migration. For example, consider the airline ticket agent. The user of the 
agent can im plant some fictitious offers within the agent prior to dispatching 
the agent onto the network. Upon the return  of the agent, the user checks for 
the authenticity of the implanted results. The premiss is th a t if the implanted 
results are intact, then the agent and results are presumed to be authentic.
Agents can also record their path  history to detect tam pering [25]. For instance, 
as hosts are visited by an a gen t, the agent records the locations of the current 
and next host to be visited by the agent. Each entry is signed by the current 
host verifying the m igration of the an agent. Upon return  of the agent, its 
owner can verify the path  taken by its agent. If the agent migration path  strays 
from the path  recorded, then the agent has been tam pered with.
2.5  R em arks
This chapter covered some of the most im portant tra its  of the mobile agent paradigm 
including i t’s benefits and mostly security related drawbacks. The above countermea­
sure given to protect an agent all lack cryptographic strength. The next chapter will 
focus strictly on cryptographic techniques for the protection of agent.
^Chapter 4, discusses the concept of a trusted host. See cliaptor 4.1
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CHAPTER III 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES FOR 
MOBILE AGENT
This chapter describes different techniques for protecting an agent using cryptographic 
primitives. As previously discussed in section 2.4, protection of an agent first involves 
p r o te ctio n  then prevention. This chapter will first describe techniques for protection 
followed by prevention. The use of cryptographic primitives offer a new set of chal­
lenges for an agent. The user of an agent cannot offer the level and trust security 
the agent enjoys in its home environment. Once dispatched an agent is under to tal 
control of the remote host. Cryptographic key even if it can be hidden from the 
remote host, cannot be protected if the agent is to use such key.
3.1 C ryptographic P reven tion
3 .1 .1  C o m p u t i n g  w i t h  E n c r y p t e d  F u n c t io n s
Prior to the introduction of Computing with Encrypted Functions (CEF) by Sanders 
and Tschudin [32], it was widely believed th a t software only solution to  the problem 
of malicious host was impossible. CEF allows an agent to execute on remote poten­
tially hostile environments autonomously w ithout disclosing any information on the 
function of the agent or any cryptographic primitives within the agent. The basis for 
CEF is the use of a homomorphic PK E scheme th a t allows for non-interactive addi­
tion or multiplication of two encrypted cleartext messages through the m anipulations 
of ciphertext only. Given the pair of functions e, d which are the encryption and 
decryption functions respectively and two ciphertext messages e{x)  and e{y).  Homo­
morphic encryption allows for the efficient calculation of e{x +  y) and e{xy)  without
25
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disclosing either values x oi  y . To illustrate, Alice A  has a function /  which Bob B  is 
willing to execute for her with his input x.  To hide the functionality of /  from Bob, A  
encrypts /  into another function e ( /) . A  then creates a program P{ e [ f ) )  which im­
plements e ( /)  and the procedures A D D  and M U L T ,  sends them  along with F (e ( /) )  
to B. B  then executes the program P{ e { f ) )  on x  to obtain P{ e{ f { x) ) ) ,  each call for 
addition uses the procedure A D D  and multiplication uses M U L T .  Once execution of 
F (e ( /) )  is completed, B  sends F (e (/(x )))  back to A  who decrypts it to obtain f {x) .  
If /  is a signature or encryption algorithm then A  has effectively signed or encrypted 
information respectively w ithout disclosing her private key (see Figure 4).
I  P(e(f))  -
f  ;  -  e(f)
Alice
W  - —  d(e(f(x)))  '
P(e(f))
Network Bob
Figure 4: Computing with Encrypted Functions.
3.1.1.1 Undetachable Digital Signatures
The use of CEF was also extended to producing Undetachable Digital Signatures 
(UDS) where a signature routine can be “attached” to the function /  such that
f s i g n e d   ̂  ̂ f
Let / ,  s be rational functions and s is used by A  to sign the message m where m is 
the output of /  on some data  x.
m =  / (z )
26
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Let V be the verification function of s, where
and V is public. To make the signature undetachable, A  sends {fsigned, f )  to B. B  
uses his input x to  produce {fsigned{x), f (x) ) .  Using the public verification function 
V anyone can verify that,
s. 1.1.2 Remarks
CEF provides protection for both the agent and the host. The functionality of the 
agent is protected because of the encryption of / .  Hosts are also protected because 
/  is executed with the input x controlled by the host. CEF has since been shown 
to  be useful for all polynomial-time functions by Cachin et al [4] and Kotzanikolaou 
et al [27] showed th a t it can be used with the RSA signature scheme. However the 
construction of encrypted functions is complex and has y e t to be shown to  work with 
a more wide range of functions.
Algeheimer et al. [1] later showed that non-interactive secure mobile agent com­
puting schemes do not exist. N on -in ter  a c tiv e  refers to no interactions between the 
host and agent during the agent execution. CEF allows the secure evaluation of /  to 
produce only a final result. Therefore, agents cannot react to  host actions during its 
execution. Using the airline agent example, suppose the agent’s previous best offer 
is c. If the output of /  is to  accept or reject the offer x by the host. Then there 
is nothing th a t keeps the host from continuing to make an offer x' until c has been 
completely exposed by the agent.
3 .1 .2  S l id in g  E n c r y p t io n
Sliding Encryption [40] is a deterministic m ethod for operations on public key cryp­
tosystems. It allows for encryption of small amounts plain text into same size cipher
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text. A general description of the m ethod will be given here. More details can be 
found in [40].
Let m  be the size of a RSA key and m is a power of 2. Plain-texts are broken 
into small equal sized blocks Oi, dg, - - - , where 'ii, \  <  i <  k and ]ai] =  u. Let 
V be the size of some random string and t  =  u +  v  where t  m  and t  divides m. 
To perform slide encryption requires the use of a stack S, an accumulator A  and an 
window W . Elements of A[i] and W['i] are of size t. Let e ,d  be the encryption and 




Figure 5: Slide Encryption.
of >l[l], the upper v  order of bytes contain random strings. The accumulator is then 
encrypted to  obtain e(A). .A[l] is then slid into W [m /t]. To encrypt Ug, Og is pu t into 
the lower order byte of ^[1], the upper v  order of bytes contain random strings. The 
accumulator is then encrypted and A[l] is slid into W [ m / t  — 1]. This process repeats 
until üm/t has been slid into W [l] a t which tim e W  is pushed onto the S, pu sh{W ).  
The plain tex t am/t+i to aom/t uses the same process. This repeats until all k plain 
text blocks are encrypted. Decryption is the exact reverse of the encryption.
28
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3.1.2.1 Remarks
Slide encryption was designed with minimizing agent code in mind. A smaller agent 
gives the agent better mobility, but because the decryption key stored in one location, 
any breach of security a t th a t location would allow an adversary access to the plain 
text.
3.2 C ryptographic D etec tion
3 .2 .1  P a r t i a l  R e s u l t  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  C o d e
Partial Result Authentication code (PRAC) was proposed by Yee [39]. PRAC, requires 
tha t the a g en t and owner m aintain a set of secret keys incrementally generated on each 
host the agent visits. The secret key is used to generate a cryptographic checksum 
(similar to MAC) of an agent’s state and results on each host it visits. Once used, 
the secret key is destroyed by the agent before moving to the next host, thus insuring 
forward integrity. More formally, suppose th a t an agent is to visit a list of servers 
s i , . . . ,  s„, if the agent encounters a malicious server Sc where c <  n, the information 
collected at s i , . . .  Sc-i is preserved. Because only the agent and its owner know the 
secret keys and the agent’s copy is destroyed after use, only the owner of the agent 
can authenticate any results.
3.2.1.1 remarks
The m aintaining of the secret keys by the owner requires an agent to contact its owner 
from each host it visits. This reduces agent autonomy and because the keys are stored 
in one location (owner) any breach of security a t th a t location could potentially reveal 
all the secret keys.
3 .2 .2  C r y p t o g r a p h ic  T r a c e s
Vigna [35] proposed a process where the executing host is required to produce a 
trace of operations performed by the agent. The PK l is used for the generation of
29
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a hash and securing of communication between the agent owner and executing host. 
During agent execution, the host records (logs) the operations performed by the agent. 
Upon term ination of execution, a hash of the agent operations and is current sta te  
is calculated. A copy of the trace is stored by the host so tha t it can be produced 
later a t the request of the agent owner. The hash is then forwarded to the agent 
owner. Thus allowing an agent owner to re-execute the agent with data  supplied 
by the host and compare the hash of the re-execution with the one supplied by the 
host. To produce a cryptographic trace requires multiple rounds of communication 
between the owner of the agent and the host executing the agent. Figure 6 illustrates 
the rounds of communication to produce the execution trace.
1 . =
2. g  A I mg =  gX-B, A, Û, /i(mi), AF)
3. A g  I m3 =  A,(A, g , gp(K.4))
4. g  A I m,4 =  g ,(B , A, A(m3))
5. g  A I ms =  g ,(g , A,f^, Aa(SB),fi(T^),fg)
6. A g  I me =  A^(A, g , Ù , h(ms))
7. g  A I my = g ,(g , A,2^,Ap(KB))
Figure 6: Cr-yptographic Tracing Steps.
In Figure 6 , Alice A is the owner of the agent and Bob B  is the executing host. 
Let rui be a message where 1 <  L Let (Ap, A,) and (gp, g«) be A and g ’s public and 
private keys respectively and A ^  B  is the passing of m, from A to B.  Let A(m,) 
be the hash value of m, and h is a one way hash function. Singing (e.g. Produce a 
DS) of a message by A or B  is indicated by A  ̂ or g^ respectively.
S te p  1: In Figure 6 , the message mi is from A to g  as indicated by the first two
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fields of each The singing of all m* insures authenticity of messages to 
the receiving party. The third held is a unique identifier for all messages 
during this execution request. A time stam p Ia is also included in m i to ensure 
’’freshness” of the message and to guard against reply-attacks. The last field, 
K a (p ) is the program p  (agent) to be executed by B  encrypted with a secret 
key K a chosen by A.
S t e p  2: B  has options of either to accept or reject the request which is contained in 
the message M .  A hash of m i is returned to the agent owner to  ensure to A  
th a t m i was received by B  correctly.
S t e p  3: If M  is an accept message, then A  responds with m 3 which contain the K a  
required by B  to decrypt the program p.
S t e p  4: An acknowledgment message 1714 is sent by g  to A indicating th a t B  has 
successfully decrypted p. Again a hash of the previous message received by B  
is returned to A. Now th a t p  has been decrypted, B  proceeds to execute p  and 
the trace, Tg is recorded by B.
S t e p  5; Once p  has completed execution, Sb, the state (results of execution) of p, 
is recorded and encrypted with a random  key K b  to obtain Kb { Sb ) -  Then a 
hash A(Tg) is generated along with another time stam p tg . B  then proceeds to 
send mg to A.
S t e p  6: W hen m g is received by A, A replies with an acknowledgement message mg 
requesting for K b  to  decrypt the state of agent Sb-
S t e p  7: If all previous steps were successful, B  sends A m? which contains K b-  A 
can now decrypt state  of the agent to obtain the state Sb-
If A suspects that B  has cheated while executing p, A can request tha t B  send
Tg and the data  used to produce Tg. A first computes h{Tg)' and compares it with
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h{Tg) received in mg to check the authenticity of Tg. If the h{Tg)' — h{Tg) ,  A  
executes p  to  produce Tg'. If Tg'A Tg, A  knows th a t B  has cheated.
3.2.2.1 remarks
The lim itation of using cryptographic tracing is the large number of rounds of commu- 
n'nation required per execution. This somewhat undermines some of the key benefits 
of the mobile agent paradigm of autonomy and independence.
3 .3  R em arks
The techniques discussed in this chapter all provide an agent with the capability to 
use cryptographic primitives on a remote host. CEF aims not only to  provide privacy 
for the agent da ta  but also any potentially proprietary agent algorithm. However, 
as mentioned earlier, the generation of the encrypted function is only limited to 
polynomial functions. SE offers an agent better mobility by limiting the size of 
encrypted data. However, the strength of the scheme depends on the securing of 
the private key. The next chapter introduces Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS) for mobile 
agent cryptography. Although, its aim is not as bold as CEF, its application is similar 
to SE but because the private key is shared, the compromising of the private key is 
much more challenging for an adversary.
32
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IV 
SSS FOR AGENT CRYPTOGRAPHY
This chapter will introduce the idea of using SSS for mobile agent cryptography. As 
mentioned earlier, the distribution of the private-key amongst n provides additional 
protection against a adversary. This chapter will outline the protocol for initialization, 
distribution and hiding of shares within agents. Later in the chapter, a modified 
version of the protocol will be introduced which allows an agent on remote trusted 
hosts (TH) to distribute agents of own.
4.1  Trusted H osts
Here, TH will be defined as any host which can provide an agent with a Secure 
Execution Environment (SEE) including protection against the following attacks as 
categorized by [2]. Integrity attacks, an agent is secure from tam pering by the host 
and other entities such as other agents. Availability refusal, an authorized agent 
cannot be denied access to resources which has been universally agreed upon to be 
vital to the proper function of an agent such as, CPU cycles, RAM, storage space 
and network bandwidth to  m igrate to other hosts. Confidentiality attacks, an agent 
private assets cannot be destroyed, tem pered with or made public by the host or 
other entities. Authentication risks, when requested, a host must be able to provide 
appropriate credentials (e.g. Certificate from a CA) so tha t the agent can authenticate 
the identity of the host.
It is assumed th a t the home environment of an agent is trusted. Therefore, the 
first and obvious TH is an agent’s home environment. The process of initializing 
agents for distribution involves the generation of a pair of public and private keys.
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The importance of keeping the private-key secure is obvious, therefore, the key gener­
ation process -will only be performed on a TH. All hosts are classified as either trusted  
or non-trusted. TH are host which can provide an agent with a SEE mentioned above. 
Classification of a host as un-trusted does not imply maliciousness, but rather, it can­
not provide an agent with an execution environment tha t fulfills all the requirements 
set forth by SEE.
It is still an open question whether SEE is possible with only software based 
solutions by using current technology [1]. Some believed tha t such environment will 
only be available through specialized Secure Hardware (SH) strictly designed for agent 
execution [39, 19, 37]. In [39], a SH in the form of a secure coprocessor is under 
development which will allow for a SEE for Java ™ agen ts. In [20], a lim ited capacity 
Sm artcard was proposed th a t interacts with an agent’s code to hide the functionality 
of the code from a host. In [37], the proposed hardware provides agent code a tamper  
proof environment in which to execute.
The proposed SH all rely on cryptographic primitives of PKL The common prin­
ciple behind each of the above mentioned SH is the use of PKE. Each SH has its own 
associated public/private key pair. The public-key is made public while the private 
key is embedded into the SH either during the manufacturing process or by the m an­
ufacturer after its production. The assumption is tha t SH manufacturers are large 
multi-national corporations with valued global reputation which they wish to protect. 
Another obvious key assumption of SH is th a t the host system employing the SH can­
not tam per with the SH or gain access to  i t ’s private-key. Here is a example use of SH. 
Suppose an agent owner wants to dispatch an agent to n hosts H i .. .Hn-  Once the 
agent is created, the owner obtains the public-key of Hi,  encrypts the agent before 
sending the agent to Hi .  W hen Hi receives the agent, it decrypts the agent with its 
private-key, then proceeds to execute the agent. Upon completion of execution of the 
agent. Hi encrypts the agent with the public-key of H 2 before send the agent to H-,.
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This process continues until iF„_i, at which time the public-key of the owner is used 
to encrypt the agent. This process has effectively hidden the function of the agent 
along with any secrets the agent might be carrying.
Although SH theoretically offer unambiguous protection for an agent, unfortu­
nately such hardware is not yet available. However, for ease of discussion of the 
protocol th a t follows, the assumption will be made tha t such hardware is available 
and is employed by limited number of hosts. The purpose for SH is to extend the 
security of an agent’s home environment to a remote host. Therefore, any solution 
th a t can offer an agent SEE can be used, including non-technological social means. 
For example, a certain number of dedicated hosts which are socially bound to offering 
secure resource access to agents such as a University network, or financially bound 
such as paid TTP. A concept often discussed in the mobile agent paradigm  to act as 
an im partial m ediator [38, 35].
4-2 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing schemes (SSS) was introduced independently by Shamir [33] and 
Blakey [3] in 1979. SSS allows a secret to be distributed by a trusted  dealer to 
a set of participants which perm its only sp ec ific  subsets or a threshold number of 
participants to recover the secret.
4 .2 .1  S h a m ir ’s  T h r e s h o l d  S c h e m e
Shamir uses a polynomial (t, n)-threshold scheme, where t, n are positive integers 
and t  <  n. A  secret value k can be shared by a trusted dealer D  amongst a set 
of participants F, where F  =  { F ] l  <  i <  n} (See Appendix A, Figure 12). The 
recovery of k requires at least a set of M  participants where \M\ > t  and M  Ç P  (See 
Appendix A, Figure 13). For instance, let f =  3 and n =  5. The value k is shared 
amongst 5 participants and any 3 can regenerate k using their shares.
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4-S The Protocol
The goal of agent autonomy is to minimize number rounds of communication between 
an agent and its OriginatoA O. Therefore, the protocol’s aim is to allow agents 
to  use cryptographic primitives on remote hosts while restricting communication be- 
tv^een O  and each agent to only one round (send and receive). More precisely, let 
O be the originator (creator) of n agents, 1 <  n. Let C  the number of rounds of 
communications between O  and n agents. Therefore, the goal is such th a t C  =  n. 
Note th a t O  recursively inherits any agents generated on remote hosts by its children. 
For example, if O  generates n agents and the n agents combined generates g agents 
then O  has n +  g agents.
4 .3 .1  A g e n t  I n i t i a l i z a t i o n
Again, the point will be emphasized th a t agent initialization is to only be performed 
on a TH in order to  protect the private-key. Agent initialization involves the genera­
tion of the public/private key pair which will be used for encryption and decryption 
respectively. Share generation is performed once the private-key has been created. 
To protect each share, a random number is generated for each share. The random 
number is combined with each share prior to distribution to agents. Figure 7 outlines 
the steps required for initialization.
Here, a formal description of agent initialization will be given. Let D be the 
trusted dealer in Sham ir’s algorithm, and D is the originator of agents A , where 
A  =  { A ; | l  <  i <  n } .  Let 77 be a set of remote hosts, where H  =  {77*11 <  i <  n}.  
Let 1C be the set of all possible keys and 1C =  Zp, such tha t p >  n -f 1 is a prime and 
Zp is a finite field of size p. Let <S be the set of all possible shares and S  =  Zp. Let s* 
be the shares given to each A*, (Vi,s* e  <S). A random number Wi G Zp is generated
^Notc, in previous diapters, an agent's originator was referred to  as owner or agent owner. In 
the protocol the dealer D is also the owner and originator of agents.
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by D  for eacfi A*.
Let kjnih and k^riv be tfie public and private key pair generated by D  respectively. 
Let be the signature function using kj„-iy.
1. D  generates a key pair {kj„,b/kprif) such tha t {kpuh,kpriv} € fC.
2. D  publishes
3. D  calculates shares .s* using kpriv for each A*.
t - i
kpriv +  rnod{p)
7 =  1
4. D  also generates a random number for each A* and combines each s* +  lUi 
to obtain z* =  .s,; +  «,>*. D  then stores a copy of each re,; in a secure location.
5. D  signs each agent, .s?Pfep .̂„(Ajjjzj) with kpriv before destroying kpriv
6 . D  attaches with each A*||z,:||s{%p,.,,,(A*||z,:) and transfers each
Figure 7: Agent Initialization
In step 2 of the agent initialization (Figure 7). The requirement th a t kpub be 
published is to  allow all agents access to the public-key used for encryption. The 
publishing of kp b̂ is to  reduces the size of an agent. It is possible for agents to carry 
kpub- In step 4, the random value Wi added to each s* conceals the actual share s* from 
un-trusted hosts. Also, by concealing Si, in the event th a t a malicious host is able 
to capture all z*, w ithout the random values Wi, s* will remain hidden. The signing 
of the agent in step 5 allows D  to  authenticate each A* upon its return  and kpriv is 
destroyed because it can be regenerated upon return of t  agents.
4 .3 .2  E n c r y p t i n g
Let be the encryption function using kpub- As results R i j  (Results collected 
by agent A* on host j-)  are collected by A* on 77*j ,  j  >  1, before A* moves to
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host H ij+ i  {Note that the movement 0/ A* from host 77* j to 77jj.^i is for notational 
purposes only. Agent migration does not require an strict itinerary.), A* retrieves kp b̂ 
from the publicly accessible location and encrypts 7?*j with kpub to  obtain Gkpuhi^id)-
4 .3 .3  D e c r y p t i n g
L..V d*. be the decryption function using fcpriu- Let be verification function
for siçkp,.i„- Decryption requires a t least 7 of n  agents to return with their shares. 
Upon return  of each A*, D  verifies each A*, if verkpub{{Ai\\zi), sigkj,„„{Ai\\zi)) =  true  
D  retrieves the value rc* from the secure location and extracts each s* =  z* — w*. 
If j{f : verpub{{Ai\\zi),sigpriv{Ai\\zi) — true}\ >  t, though polynomial interpolation 
(See Appendix A Figure 13) using each s*, D  regenerates kpriv, D  can now use dkp„„ 
to decrypt obtain 77*j.
4 .4  A gen t  D is tr ibu tion  on R e m o te  Trusted H osts
Suppose A* is on a remote TH 77*, and A* wishes to distribute I agents A ' where 
A ' =  {A ' I 1 <  % <  Z} from 77*. Let SS be A*’s storage space (See Figure 1). Let w{ 
be a random  storage location within SS generated by A* and % is the contents of SS 
at location w{, % G SS {See Figure If)- Let W  =  {rcjHwgH . . .  ||u7(} and W  € Zp. Let 
S' be the set of all possible shares and S' =  Zp- Let s' be the shares given to each 
A|, (V i,s 'e ,S ') .
In the original protocol, the random values tc* was stored in a secure location on 
D ’s home environment. However, now A* is on a remote host and must migrate at 
least once (back to its home host). Therefore, the random number generated to mask 
shares m ust be hidden within A^. To accomplish this, instead of masking each share 
with the random  number re* directly. The modified protocol generates a random 
storage location re' within SS. The contents r/* at location re' is used to mask each 
s' (See Figure 14). The combined randomly generated memory locations W  is also 
shared amongst I agents as r*. Figure 8 illustrates the modified protocol for agent
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distribution on remote TH. Note tha t in Figure 8, A* is represented by D.
Let uf represent a random  memory location in A /s  SS. Let % be the contents at 
w f  Let 7'i be shares of W  generated for each A '.
1. D  generates a keys pair {kpublkpri) such that {kj^b, kpriv} 6 1C.
2. D  publishes kpub-
3. D  calculates shares .s' using kpriv for each A '.
j=i
4. D  also generates a random memory location w[ for each A ' and combines its 
contents y* w ith s' to obtain z' =  s' +  iji (See Figure 14).
5. D  calculates shares r* for each A ' using W .
Ti — W  +  üjX-’ mod{p)
j=i
6 . D  signs each agent, 8i,%p,.„,(A'||z'||rJ with kpriv before destroying kpriv
7. D  attaches with each A '||z '||r/|sigkp i,.„(A '||2 '||r*) and transfers each 
(All^llnllaZg^, XAIIkilln)) to 77'.
Figure 8 : Agent initialization on remote hosts.
4 .4 .1  E n c r y p t i n g
The procedure for an agent to perform encryption on results gathered on remote hosts 
is the same as outlined in Section 4.3.2.
4 .4 .2  D e c r y p t i n g
Decryption is performed only on the home host (User in Figure 10) regardless where 
the agent was generated. The decryption process is also similar to the procedure 
outlined Section 4.3.3. But because the value y* in stored within A./s SS. decryption 
can be performed only when A* returns to its home host. First the value r, is extracted
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from each A ' to generate the combined random locations W  through polynomial 
interpolation. Using each w' the values % is retrieved from A /s  SS. Using each s', 
again through polynomial interpolation, kpriv can be regenerated.
4 .5  R em a rk s
The distributing of the private-key amongst agents offers greater protection for the 
key. Not only will a malicious host have to capture a t least t agents, it must also find 
the shares within each agent. For example, suppose a host has all of the agents and 
is able to find the values z*, without the random value w*, s* is considerably harder to 
obtain. Independence and autonomy are key characteristic of an agent. Therefore, the 
ability to  distribute agents on remote hosts have some obvious advantages. However, 
this also posses new challenges. How to hide a secret within an agent? Through 
the use of secret sharing, and information hiding within an agent’s SS it was shown 
th a t information and private-keys can be hidden within a number of agents. The use 
of Sham ir’s threshold scheme also allows for inherent fault-tolerance because only t 
of n  shares are required to regenerate the private key. Thus, the robustness of the 
algorithm allows regeneration of the private-key even iî n — t  agents are destroyed, 
lost, or tem pered with.
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CHAPTER V 
SECRET SHARING WITH RSA KEYS
This chapter will demonstrate how the protocol of Chapter 4 can be implemented 
with RSA [28] PK E algorithm. RSA keys can be used for encryption/ decryption and 
for DS.
5.1 R S A  Overview
Let n  =  p q  be the RSA modulus and p , q  are primes. Let a, b be the encryption and 
decryption keys respectively where:
ah =  1 mod[(j){n)) and </)(n) =  (p  — l ) ( q  -  1)
The values p , q , b are private and n , a are public. Given the message m  encryption is 
defined as:
y  =  efc(m) =  m “ mod{n),
decryption is defined as:
dkiy) =  y'̂  mod{n)  =  m
signature is defined as:
sigk{m) =  mod{n)  
and verification of sigk{m) is defined as:
verk{m , sigk{m)) =  true  x =  mod{n)
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5.2 A gen t In it ia l iza tion
Let sigh be the signature function using private value b.
1. D  generates the primes p ,q  and calculates the RSA modulus n.
2. D  calculates the private value b and the public value a, then destroys the p , q  
and publishes the public values n, a in a accessible location.
3. Using the private value b, D  generates s,; for each A,.
t- i
Si =  b +  ^  (ijX  ̂ mod{p)
.7 =  1
4. D generates a random number Wi for each A.;, and distributes Zi =  .s, +  u;,; to 
each Ai.
5. D signs each agent, s% (A i||Z ;) with b before destroying b.
6 . D attaches with each A i||zi||sig,;(A i||zi) and transfers each 
(Ai||zi||a?:g(,(Ai||zi)) toLfi.
Figure 9: Agent Initialization Using RSA Keys.
5.3 R S A  E ncryp ting
Let e„ be the encryption function using the public key a. As results Ri ĵ are collected 
by Aj on host iLjj, j  >  1, before Ai moves to  host Hj+i  (Again note th a t movement of 
Ai from host H ij  to i ï i j+ i  is for notational purposes only. Agent m igration does not 
require an itinerary.), Ai retrieves a from the public accessible location and encrypts
R i j  w ith a to obtain:
T M o d (n )
5.4 R S A  D ecryp ting
Let db be the decryption function using key b. Let veva be verification function for 
sigh- Decryption requires a t least t of n  agents to return with their shares. For
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1 <  z <  f, upon return  of each Aj, D  verifies each A,, if
vera{{A^\\zi), sigh{Ai\\zi)) =  true
D  retrieves the value Wi from the secure location and extracts each Si =  Zi — Wi. If
|{% : r;era((Ai||zi), 8%g6(Aj||zi)) =  >  (
though polynomial interpolation using each Si, D  regenerates the private key b. D  
can now use to  decrypt:
43
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VI
AGENT TRACKING  
b . l  A gen t Collis ion
A host th a t contain high concentration of relevant information will eventually a ttrac t 
multiple agents from the same family^ . For example, a family of agents are created 
to find a television on behalf of its creator. It is conceivable tha t more than  one agent 
from th a t family will eventually visit the same m ajor electronics retailer. Agent 
collision occurs when a host is visited more than  once by agents from the same family 
either individually or concurrently as depicted in Figure 10.
□
U se r
09579M \  '49579W
□
iO
Figure 10: Family of agents with same unique T V  showing agent collision.
'All agents created by a user to  perform the same task. .Agents in Figure 10 are from the same 
family.
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6.2 Cookies
Cookies are small files an agent stores on each host it visits. All cookies generated 
by agents of the same family share the same unique J V  (see Figure 10). W hen an 
agent arrives, it first checks for a file on the host with the same I V  as the agent. The 
existence of a file with the same I V  on a host means the host has already been visited 
by a member of its family. Otherwise, the agent creates the file and proceeds with 
execution. To avoid overloading agent storage environments on remote hosts, cookies 
have a limited life span. Once expired, the cookie can be deleted by the remote host.
6 .2 .1  I V  G e n e r a t io n  
g .g .T l *
I V  Generation There are two requirements for the generation of I V :  the I V  should 
be as unique as possible and the generation of I V  must use a well-established publicly 
available one-way hash function (e.g. The MD5 [29] algorithm).
The generation of an unique I V  requires tha t a message m  be the input of the 
hash function h, I V  — h{m). Any random string can be used, but to ensure high 
probability of uniqueness, the suggestion is th a t m  contain information such as user’s 
IP address along with purpose of the group of agents and some salt (random numbers). 
For example, m  =  (211.112 . . .  11 "return;YVR,YYZ . . . ” \\salt). Once the I V  has been 
generated, m  must be stored in a secure accessible location to be produced when 
requested by T T P  for cookie authentication (see section on Cookie Authentication).
6 .2 .2  C o o k ie  S e c u r i t y
Possible attacks against cookies include the following; 1. Hosts use cookies as a tool 
for denial of service attacks. Because of the uniqueness of the I V ,  it would be unlikely 
th a t a host can generate the unique I V  prior to an agent’s arrival. 2. Hosts can hide 
or remove cookies before they expire. This ability is also of little concern because a 
legitimate cookie on a host means the host has already been visited by a member of
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the agent family. 3. Hosts once visited by an agent, creates their own agents with 
the same XV,  and distributes the agents onto competitors hosts to plant cookies. 
This scenario is possible, particularly for e-commerce applications where there is a 
potential for financial gain. A possible solution to this type of denial of service attack 
is the use of a T T P  to authenticate cookies.
6 .2 .3  C o o k ie  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n
Cookie authentication can be initiated by a host, or an agent tha t suspects th a t a 
cookie on the current host is fake. The authentication process is performed by the 
host with the suspect cookie. Before the cookie authentication process is described, 
a couple of assumptions will first be made. 1. All agents, including ones generated 
on remote hosts know the location of their originators. In Figure 10, all agents in the 
diagram belong to User; therefore User is the originator. 2. A host also knows the 
location (e.g. IP) of an agent’s originator.
The authentication process requires the participation of a TT P ; a T T P  could be 
any TH mentioned previously in this paper, with a signed digital certificate. The 
certificate is used to  authenticate the T T P  to the User and the Host (Figure 11). 
Connections between the Host and TTP, and the User and T T P  are secure (e.g. 
Using SSL [13] with the T T P ’s certificate). The authentication protocol requires the 
following routines.
R eq -A u th (X V ,U serIP ) .  Authentication request sent by the suspecting host to the 
T T P  to verify the I V  of the cookie.
I V .  The unique number th a t identifies a family of agents.
U s e r lP .  The location of the User th a t created the agent.
R eq _ M sg {IV ) .  Message request sent by the T T P  to the host located at U s e r I P  
(User in Figure 11).
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M sg {m ).  Response from the User located at U s e r I P  to the TTP.
rn. Input of h th a t generated I'D. 
h{rri). Hash value on the message m.
A' th { tr u e / fa l s e ) .  Reply from T T P  to the suspecting host.
t r u e / fa l s e .  W hether h{rn) =  I V  or h{m) 7  ̂I V  respectively.
The host with the cookie can request a T T P  to verify the cookie on its behalf. 
The host with its request sends the unique I V  of the cookie and the location of User 
User I D  to TTP. The T T P  then requests from User the message m  which generated 
the unique I V .  The T T P  uses the hash function h to generate h{m) =  I V .  If 




Figure 11: Cookie Authentication
6.3 R em arks
In Section 6.2.3, two assumptions were made. The first assumption was th a t every 
agent knows the location of its originator. This assumption was made because in 
the model described above, every agent must return to their respective originators.
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This assumption is also im portant for the cookie authentication process. If a host 
is to  check authenticity of a cookie, it must know the location of originator (User in 
Figures 10,11) of the agent. The second assumption was th a t a remote host knows 
the originator of an agent it executes. This fact is especially im portant because to 
authenticate a cookie, the current host (host with the cookie) sends the T T P  the 
message R eq . .A u th {IV ,U se rIP )  to User. This message contains U e se rIP ,  which 
should be location of User. However if the current host is not certain where an agent 
comes from, then there is possibility tha t although the final response from T T P  is 
M sg{m )  =  true, there is no certainty tha t the cookie is authentic.
For example, given two hosts X , Y  and host X  and Y  are competitors. Let host 
X  be a malicious host. Suppose agent A% visits host X  first and A i ’s originator is
O. Now host X  knows both  the purpose of A i and i t ’s unique I V .  Host X  then 
generates its own agent A) and sends it to host Y  and A) plants a cookie on host Y  
with the same I V  as A i. Suppose A) arrives at host Y  before A i. W hen A i arrives 
two things could happen. First, A i could simply move on thinking th a t host Y  has 
already been visited. Second, A i suspects tha t the cookie is fake and requests the 
current host to authenticate the cookie. If the current host doesn’t know the true 
originator of the cookie is from host X  and believe the cookie is from O. W hen host 
Y  authenticates the cookie, the request will be sent to T T P  which then sends the 
request to O. After the authentication process is complete, the message from T T P  
will show th a t the cookie is authentic when in fact its fake.
4S
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
This thesis explored the mobile agent paradigm from the security perspective. Some 
key benefits of a mobile agent was discussed as well as how they can contribute to the 
overall network computing community. Various applications which can benefit from 
an agent’s flexibility, mobility and scalability was also investigated and their security 
requirement highlighted.
Mobile agent computing as with most emerging technology has many unresolved 
issues. The most significant of which are in the area of security. Technologies such as 
programming languages and network infrastructures are all in place for deployment 
of agents. However, until the establishment of a well defined set specifications which 
the network community as a whole is willing to adopt, mobile agent development will 
still remain ad hoc in nature.
The contribution of this research is the use of secret sharing schemes as a tool for 
security. Using secret sharing scheme, it was shown that an agent with a public-key 
can perform encryption on remote hosts while protecting the private-key for decryp­
tion though secret sharing. All the tools required for implementation such as secret 
sharing schemes and PK E are available and proven secure. The example showing 
implementation using the RSA PK E demonstrates tha t the protocol is practical.
Agent tracking using a cookie concept borrowed from the web browser technology 
showed how to avoid agent collision. The security issues with using such technology 
was also discussed and solutions proposed.
In future work, the hope is to explore other uses for secret sharing in the mobile 
agent paradigm. Another possible branch of this research is the use of CEF for the
49
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generation of shares on remote hosts because as mentioned earlier, CEF has been 
shown to work with polynomial functions [4].
50
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APPENDIX A
SHAMIR’S THRESHOLD SCHEME
A . l  In it ia l iza t ion  and Share D is tr ibu tion
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n  a n d  S h a r e  D i s t r i b u t i o n
1. D  chooses n distinct non-zero elements of Zp denoted by xi, 1 < 
i <  n and p > w  +  l .  For 1 <  i <  n, D  gives each Pi the value i , .
2. To share the key k E Zp, D  secretly chooses a t random t — 1 
element of Zp, Ui, «2----
3. For 1 <  i <  n, D  calculates % =  a(x,:), where
t - i
a(x) =  k +  ^  üjX  ̂ mod(p)
J=i
4. For 1 <  i <  n, D  gives the share y, to F).
Figure 12: S ham ir’s {t,n)-threshold scheme in Zp. Initialization and Share D istri­
bution. [34]
A . 1 .1  I n i t i a l i z a t i o n  a n d  S h a r e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  E x a m p l e
This is a small example of to illustrate Shamir’s Threshold Scheme [34]. 
Let t  =  2), and p — 17 and n  =  5 and fc =  uq =  13 
Given the polynomial:
a[x) =  uo 4- a\x  -t- mod{p)
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step 3  F ig u r e  1 2 )
Let a\ =  10 and 02 — 2
o ( l ) =  13 + 10 +  2 m o d [n )
a ( l ) =  8 m o d { n )
0 (2 ) =  13 + 1 0 ( 2 ) + 2(2)^ mod{17)
0 (2 ) =  7 mod{17)
o (3 ) =  13 + 1 0 ( 3 ) + 2 (3 ) ' m od{l7)
o (3 ) =  10 m od{l7)
o (4 ) =  13 + 10(4)+ 2 (4 ) ' mod{17)
0 (4 ) =  0 m od{\7)
o (5 ) =  13 + 1 0 ( 5 ) + 2 (5 ) ' m od[\7)
o (5 ) =  11 m od{l7)
Let i == { 1 ,3 ,5 } , f i  =  8 . P2 = 10, P5 =  :
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A . 2 K e y  R econstruction
K e y  R e c o n s t r u c t i o n
The regeneration of k is achieved though polynomial interpolation. 
Suppose P i^ ,. . . ,  Pi, want to regenerate the k, th e y  know that
Vij —
and I <  i <  t where a{x) € Zp[x] is the secret polynomial chosen by 
D. Since a{x) has degree at most t — 1, a(x) can be written as
a(x) — ao +  (2ix  +  . . .  +  (it^iX
where ao is the key and the coefficient o,o . . .  are unknown elements 
of Zp. Since iji =  a{x), 1 <  i <  t, M  can obtain t linear equations with 
t  unknowns o,o,. . . .  cp-i with all arithm etic done in Zp. If the equations 
are linearly independent, there will be a unique solution and Oq is the 
key.
Figure 13: S ham ir’s {t,n)-threshold scheme in Zp. K ey Reconstr‘uction.\iY\
A . 2 .1  K e y  R e c o n s t r u c t i o n  E x a m p l e
Let t  =  3, and p =  17 and n =  5 and Xi =  i and M  =  {P i,  P2 , Ps} with shares 
8,10,11 respectively(See A.1.1).
ao +  ai +  Ü2 — 8 mod(17)
ÜQ +  3a\ +  9(ï2 — 10 mod(17)
ÜQ +  5a+8a2 =  11 mod(17)
Solving the system of linear equations we get üq =  13, ai =  10 and 02 =  2. Since 
k =  Ü0 =  13, therefore the key has been successfully regenerated.
Given the polynomial:
53
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APPENDIX B 
SHARE HIDING WITHIN AGENT’S STORAGE 
SPACE
IV,'















yi' = E98CA2764AED839D5853C 
zi' = S ,'+  yi
Figure 14: Share hiding within the Storage Space (SS) of an agent.
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